On Saturday, 1973, the Day of Atonement – the most holy day of the year for the Jewish people – became the harbinger of Doom for the Congregations of Israel.
At 13:55 hours that day rolling Syrian cannon thunder was heard all along the front on the Golan Heights, and dense, black smoke shrouded it completely.
Many accounts of the Yom Kippur War have been written. But this is the first behind- the-scenes look at the Northern Command preparations for war during that fateful summer, when the Syrian army in the north, together with the Egyptian army in the south, coordinated a blitzkrieg offensive against Israel. The book offers fresh insight into the pre-war debate that raged between the Northern Command and the Intelligence Branch that believed Syria was not looking for war.
For the first time, the reader will be privy to the decision-making details that threatened to overpower the IDF Command.
The Generals, who were in command, describe in their own words the pivotal battles that changed the course of the war, as well as the disastrous effects of the “hindsight evaluation” after the war was won reverberated throughout the corridors of power.